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I. APPROPRIATION ART
In a little, largely-overlooked paperback anthology published in
1973, there is an essay on New England artist Hank Herron.1
Herron, the article tells us, for his one-man show had reproduced
the entire oeuvre of minimalist painter and printmaker Frank
Stella.2 In so doing, Herron was judged to have created something
more than Stella: “in their real meanings, these objects are Stellas
plus.”3 The crucial difference between an original Stella and a
visually indistinguishable Herron, we are told, comes on further
consideration of the artists’ respective projects: “one begins to be
more profoundly conscious of and receptive to a radically new and
philosophical element in the work of Mr. Herron that is precluded
in the work of Mr. Stella, i.e., the denial of originality.”4


Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa.
Cheryl Bernstein, The Fake as More, in IDEA ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 41, 41
(Gregory Battcock ed., 1973).
2
See id. at 42.
3
Id. at 42.
4
Id. at 44–45.
1
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With his method and apparent philosophical approach, Herron
would be characterized today as an appropriation artist—if he
existed, which he didn’t. Nor did the attributed author of the
article, Cheryl Bernstein. Both Herron and Bernstein were
inventions of art historian, Carol Duncan, a hoax that went
undetected for over a decade.5 On this realization, one might think
that Duncan’s game was a clever reductio ad absurdum, taking the
direction of postmodern art to its hypothetical end to illustrate the
inanity of the whole project. And this may have been the case.
But, perhaps unknown to Duncan, the fictional Herron’s project
largely parallels the work of real-life artist Elaine Sturtevant, active
at the time of Duncan’s writing, and probably the earliest artist to
be labeled an appropriation artist.6 Although she did not attempt to
reproduce any single artist’s body of work, Sturtevant (as she
prefers to be called) reproduced works by the likes of Roy
Lichtenstein, Jasper Johns, Andy Warhol, and yes, Frank Stella.7
Typically, Sturtevant would repaint another artist’s painting from
memory, usually inserting some hidden “error” in her version.8
However, in one famous case, Sturtevant obtained from Warhol
the silkscreens he used to create his series of “Flowers” prints, and
used these to create indistinguishable duplicates.9 When her 1967
reproduction of Claes Oldenburg’s Store incited hostility from the

5
Duncan’s hoax was ultimately uncovered by another art historian, Thomas Crow.
See Thomas Crow, The Return of Hank Herron, in ENDGAME 11, 11–16 (Yve-Alain Bois
et al. eds., 1986). Duncan has caught many in her web. See, e.g., Alan Tormey,
Transfiguring the Commonplace, 33 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 213, 214 (1974)
(quoting “critic Cheryl Berstein”); Gregory L. Ulmer, Borges and Conceptual Art, 5
BOUNDARY 2 845, 847 (1977) (same); Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J.175, 231 n.231 (1990) (citing Bernstein).
6
See Bruce Hainley, Erase and Rewind, FRIEZE, June 6, 2000, available at
http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/erase_and_rewind/77. Sturtevant herself has resisted
this label.
7
See Dan Cameron, A Conversation: A Salon History of Appropriation with Leo
Castelli and Elaine Sturtevant, 134 FLASH ART 76, 76 (1988), available at
http://www.flashartonline.com/interno.php?pagina=articolo_det&id_art=816&det=ok&tit
le=A-CONVERSATION; Hainley, supra note 6.
8
Bill Arning, Sturtevant, 2 J. CONTEMPORARY ART 39, 46 (1989); Cameron, supra
note 7.
9
See Cameron, supra note 7; Hainley, supra note 6.
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art community (and particularly from Oldenburg himself),10
Sturtevant disappeared from the art world for over a decade, during
which time a number of young artists took up the task of art
appropriation.11
Appropriation art traces its conceptual origins back to an
artistic movement and to a philosophical paradigm shift.12 The
artistic movement in question began with the “readymades” of
Marcel Duchamp, works consisting entirely of ordinary objects
found or purchased by the artist, and presented largely unchanged
as art.13 Duchamp’s most famous readymade, Fountain, consists
of a common porcelain urinal, upended, and signed with the
pseudonym, “R. Mutt 1917.”14 Duchamp’s work presented a
conceptual breakthrough in modern art, opening the doors for
artists to select objects from the world around them, rather than
fabricating paint, clay, and bronze into new art objects.15
The philosophical origin of appropriation art came half a
century later, in a 1967 essay by Roland Barthes, “The Death of
the Author.”16 In the famous essay, Barthes rails against the ageold notion that the author or artist is the arbiter of a work’s
meaning.17 So far as meaning is concerned, Barthes suggests, the
author “dies” when the work is released to the public, and becomes
just another reader.18 Another philosopher, Michel Foucault,
following the same line of thought, suggests that imposing an
author—a Romantic invention, he asserts—on a work limits the
meaning of the work.19 On this basis, authors and artists began to
10

See Cameron, supra note 7.
See Hainley, supra note 6
12
See Francis M. Naumann, Duchamp, Marcel, in GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. ART
97, 102 (Joan M. Marter ed., 2011); Appropriation, MoMALearning, http://
www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/themes/pop-art/appropriation (last visited Jan. 28,
2013).
13
See Naumann, supra note 12, at 97, 102.
14
See Naumann, supra note 12, at 100.
15
See, e.g., Naumann, supra note 12, at 101.
16
See ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 142,
146 (1977).
17
See id. at 142, 143, 148.
18
See id. at 142, 148.
19
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE 124, 134, 137–38 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977).
11
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question the nature of authorship, and attempted to distance
themselves from it.20
One might have difficulty labeling
Duchamp’s readymades “art,”21 or question the validity of Barthes’
and Foucault’s claims,22 but the influence of Duchamp and Barthes
is, in a word, inestimable.
While Sturtevant was on hiatus, a number of New York artists
began experimenting with art appropriation.23 Sherrie Levine,
perhaps best known for her series “After Walker Evans,” famously
re-photographs others’ photographs24—in this case, the depressionera portraits taken by Evans. Richard Prince became famous rephotographing advertisements—especially Marlboro ads depicting
the “Marlboro Man”—cropping out visual and textual indications
that these were advertisements.25 Jeff Koons, meanwhile, turned to
what he took to be objects of everyday commercial banality, his
most famous work being a 1986 stainless-steel replica of an
inflatable toy rabbit, Rabbit.26 For those familiar with copyright
law, it will perhaps seem ironic that the legal troubles for
appropriation artists began in earnest when they strayed from such
straightforward appropriation.27
20

See Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art, 45 BRIT. J.
AESTHETICS 123, 123–24, 126 (2005).
21
See Naumann, supra note 12, at 98; Rob Sharp, The Loo that Shook the World:
Duchamp,
Man
Ray,
Picabi,
INDEPENDENT
(Feb.
20,
2008),
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/the-loo-that-shook-theworld-duchamp-man-ray-picabi-784384.html. However, a 2004 survey of British art
experts named Fountain the most influential work in the history of modern art. See
Duchamp’s Urinal Tops Art Survey, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2004, 5:56 PM),
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4059997.stm.
22
Many have. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 1–4 (1967).
23
See Andrew Russeth, The Original: Doing the Elastic Tango with Sturtevant,
GALLERISTNY (May 8, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://galleristny.com/2012/05/the-originaldoing-the-elastic-tango-with-sturtevant/ (interviewing Sturtevant and discussing the rise
of appropriation art during her hiatus).
24
See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 137–38 (1988).
25
Klaus Ottmann, Prince, Richard, in GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. ART 194, 194
(Joan M. Marter ed., 2011).
26
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
27
See Carlin, supra note 24, at 137 (noting that some appropriation artists have drawn
legal attention which has not made it to court. Levine, for instance, reportedly ceased rephotographing images by photographer Edward Weston when Weston’s estate threatened
to sue).
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II. LEGAL TROUBLES
Jeff Koons’ exhibition, “The Banality Show,” opened at New
York’s Sonnabend Gallery in 1988.28 For the show, Koons had
commissioned a number of three-dimensional sculptures in wood
and porcelain from artisans around the world. The sculptures are
based on images of popular culture Koons had culled from
postcards, cartoon strips, and elsewhere.29 The Banality Show
immediately garnered no fewer than three copyright infringement
suits against Koons and the gallery.30 The first of these centered
on Koons’ sculpture, String of Puppies, a life-sized painted
wooden sculpture (in four editions) depicting, from the knees up, a
couple sitting on a bench holding a litter of eight blue puppies
with comically large noses.31 The couple is dressed in brightly
colored clothes, with daisies in their hair.
String of Puppies was based on a black-and-white photograph
by Art Rogers, “Puppies,” which had originally been
commissioned by an acquaintance of Rogers’, and later licensed by
Museum Graphics for a notecard.32 Koons purchased a copy of the
card at a commercial card shop, believing it “typical,
commonplace and familiar”—a paradigm of popular commercial
culture.33 Koons tore the copyright notice from the card and sent it
along with an enlarged photocopy and a chart to the Demetz Studio
in Ortessi, Italy, with instructions to craft a sculpture of the couple
and puppies depicted in the photograph.34 Koons oversaw the
sculpting and painting of String of Puppies, providing written
instructions specifying that, aside from the color, the puppies’

28

See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304.
See United Feature Syndicate Inc., v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(explaining the artistic intent and materials used by Koons in “The Banality Show”).
30
See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 305; United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 817 F. Supp. at
372; Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1,
1993).
31
See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
32
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 304.
33
See id. at 305.
34
See id. at 305.
29
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noses, and the daisies, the sculpture should accurately replicate the
scene depicted in the photograph.35
Rogers learned of Koons’ sculpture in 1989 and filed suit
against Koons and the Sonnabend Gallery, alleging copyright
infringement and unfair competition.36 The district court found
that String of Puppies did, indeed, infringe on Rogers’ photograph,
and did not qualify as a fair use.37 The court granted summary
judgment and ordered Koons and the Sonnabend Gallery to turn
over all infringing articles to Rogers, and enjoined the defendants
from making, selling, lending, or displaying any copies of the
sculpture, or any other derivative works based on “Puppies.”38
Koons appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s decision.39
Koons’ central defense was made on the basis of fair use,
centrally arguing that String of Puppies qualified as a parody,40
specifically “a satire or parody of society at large.”41 A defense of
fair use rests on § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, which lays
out four non-exclusive, non-exhaustive factors upon which
consideration of “fair” use traditionally rests: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount and substantiality of the work used, and (4) the effect of
the use on the market value of the original.42
Arising from the 1841 case of Folsom v. Marsh,43 the fair use
doctrine was ultimately codified in the Copyright Act to help
balance creators’ interests with those of the users of copyrighted
works in situations where strictly enforcing copyright would

35

See id. at 305.
See id.
37
See Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. at 480.
38
See id. at 306.
39
See id.
40
Koons also argued that what he copied from “Puppies” did not meet the definition of
an original work of authorship under the law. See id. at 309. On the long-established
basis of Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony (11 U.S. 53 (1884)), however, the
district court found the contents of “Puppies” protected by copyright, and the court of
appeals confirmed. See id. at 306–08.
41
See id. at 309.
42
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
43
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
36
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hinder, rather than advance, the “Progress of Science and useful
Arts”44 that copyright law was designed to promote.45 Nothing in
the Act specifies that the four factors should be considered of equal
weight, nor whether they should be considered individually or
holistically.46 Rather, the fair use doctrine was designed for
maximum flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis by the
judiciary.47
Section 107, which encodes the fair use doctrine, explicitly
cites “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . scholarship, or research” as examples of
presumptively fair uses.48 This illustrative list has made special
room for cases of parody, taken to be a valuable form of criticism,
and central to the purposes of fair use.49 Parody has come to be
roughly defined, for legal purposes, as a work which, in imitating a
preexisting work, ridicules that very work.50 The first of the four
factors—the purpose and character of the use—explicitly considers
“whether such use is of a commercial nature.”51 Commercial uses
have been established by the Supreme Court as presumptively
unfair.52 However, where a work is found to be parodic, its

44

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (failing to state how the four factors of fair use should
be utilized); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 476.
47
This flexibility has resulted in what at least one court calls “the most troublesome
[doctrine] in the whole of copyright.” Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662
(2d Cir. 1939); see also Darren Hudson Hick, Mystery and Misdirection: Some Problems
of Fair Use and Users’ Rights, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 485, 485 (2009).
48
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
49
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994) (finding that
“parody, like other comment and criticism, may claim fair use.”); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that an allegedly infringing song was an
infringement of the copyrighted song because it did not constitute as fair use since it was
not a parody of the copyrighted material).
50
See MCA, Inc., 677 F.2d at 184–85 (explaining that a song sung to the tune of a
copyrighted song by a satirical comedy program was a parody).
51
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
52
See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(explaining that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright”).
45
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commerciality has generally been considered a non-issue.53 The
second factor is traditionally taken to distinguish between works of
fact and works of fiction, such that the more “creative” the
original, the more this factor tends to weigh against a finding of
fair use.54 In cases of parody, however, the original is usually a
creative work, and so, given the potential cultural value of parody,
this factor tends to be disregarded in parody cases.55 The third
factor asks what, and how much, of the original has been taken in a
secondary work.56 Because parody, by its nature, typically
requires substantial copying—and often copying the “heart” of the
work—courts have generally given leeway in the amount copied
for a parody such as would be required to conjure up the original
work.57 Finally, the fourth factor asks about the effect of the
secondary use on the market value of the original.58 Although the
purpose of criticism—parody included—is often to devalue the
original, the Supreme Court has found that parody that suppresses
sales of the original is permissible, whereas works that, by
copying, usurp the original are not.59
53

See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85 (explaining that the “commercial . . . character of
a work is ‘not conclusive’ (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448) but rather a fact to be
‘weighed along with others in fair use decisions’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66
(1976)); see also Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value:
Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 1653, 1653 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “elimination of the
commercial presumption . . . is limited to works that convey a parodic purpose.”).
54
See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.
N.J. 1977) (finding that defendants had “greater license . . . under the fair use doctrine” to
use portions of a copyrighted work that was more a factual work than a creative work).
55
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (explaining that the second factor regarding the
nature of the work is not “ever likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from
the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works.”)
56
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
57
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (explaining that “parody presents a difficult case”
because it “necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted
imitation. . . . it must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original work to make
the object of its critical wit recognizable”).
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
59
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92 (explaining that “when a lethal parody . . . kills
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. .
. . [T]he role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism that [merely
suppresses] demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.” (quoting Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986))..
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On these bases, once it is established that a secondary use is
parodic in nature, much in the fair use doctrine is interpreted by the
courts to align in favor of the use.60 In the case of Rogers v.
Koons, however, the court found that String of Puppies did not
qualify as parody under the law:
It is the rule in this Circuit that satire need not be
only of the copied work and may, as appellants urge
of “String of Puppies,” also be a parody of modern
society, the copied work must be, at least in part, an
object of the parody, otherwise there would be no
need to conjure up the original work. . . . We think
this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise there
would be no real limitation on the copier’s use of
another’s copyrighted work to make a statement on
some aspect of society at large. If an infringement
of copyrightable expression could be justified as
fair use solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim
to a higher or different artistic use—without
insuring public awareness of the original work—
there would be no practicable boundary to the fair
use defense. . . . The problem in the instant case is
that even given that “String of Puppies” is a satirical
critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to
discern any parody of the photograph “Puppies”
itself.61
Without the label of “parody” to align them in favor of the
secondary work, all four factors of fair use were found to weigh
against String of Puppies, and Koons’ use of the photograph was
found to be unfair and infringing.62 The decision seemed to signal
60
See Berlin v. E. C. Publ’ns., Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (holding that “where . . . the
parody has neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and
where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is
necessary to ‘recall or conjure up’ the object of his satire, a finding of infringement
would be improper.”); Hick, supra note 47, at 499 (stating that the fair use doctrine does
allow for parody).
61
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992)
62
See id. at 310–12 (finding that “the first factor of the fair use doctrine cuts against a
finding of fair use . . . th[e second] factor militates against a finding of fair use . . . no
reasonable jury could conclude that Koons did not exceed a permissible level of copying
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a death knell for appropriation art.63 Art theorists reeled. Lynne
A. Greenberg summarized the outlook: “[T]he effect of the case is
to act as a powerful check on appropriation artists. Because the
stakes under copyright law for appropriating imagery from a
copyrighted work are now so high, it is likely that many artists will
steer clear of using such techniques in their future work.”64
With Rogers v. Koons decided, Koons’ other pending cases fell
much the same way. His porcelain sculpture, Wild Boy and Puppy,
was found to have infringed on the character Odie from the
Garfield comic strip,65 and another work, Ushering in Banality—a
wooden sculpture of two Putto-like figures helping a boy push an
enormous pig—was found to infringe on a photograph by Barbara
Campbell.66 Perhaps surprisingly, then, the Koons decisions
appear not to have dissuaded appropriation artists in their
activities, though it did make them a little more savvy when it
came to the law.67 Koons began licensing copyrighted materials
under the fair use doctrine . . . there is simply nothing in the record to support a view that
Koons produced ‘String of Puppies’ for anything other than sale as high-priced art.”).
63
See, e.g., Martha Buskirk, Commodification as Censor: Copyrights and Fair Use, 60
OCTOBER MIT PRESS 82, 102 (1992) (explaining how Rogers v. Koons “raises a number
of important and troubling questions about the legal status of artistic appropriation, and it
may set an important precedent with respect to the appropriation of images in works of
art. . . . The decision is particularly troubling given the way in which strategies of
appropriation have often performed a critical function”); Ronald Sullivan, Appeals Court
Rules Artist Pirated Pictures of Puppies, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1992, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/03/nyregion/appeals-court-rules-artist-pirated-pictureof-puppies.html (stating that the ruling of Rogers v. Koons “would have a chilling effect
on artistic freedom.”).
64
Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and PostModernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32–33 (1992).
65
See United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Here, Koons attempted an argument that such characters as Odie, due to their cultural
pervasiveness, had become “public figures” and had “a factual existence as such” which
entitled them to more limited copyright protection (Id. at 380), despite Koons’ own claim
that he was not familiar with the character (See id. at 384).
66
See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055, 1993 WL 97381, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
1, 1993) (holding that “Koons’ use of Campbell’s photograph to make ‘Ushering in
Banality’ was completely unauthorized. . . . [His] infringement was clearly willful.”).
67
See E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1485 (1993) (explaining that the “unsettled state
of law has meant that artists have often faced a significant amount of complaint and
resistance from the copyright holders of the works they appropriate. The legal
uncertainty could clearly work to the artists’ advantage at time”); Laura Gilbert, No
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for his works, obtaining permission from many copyright holders,
including United Features Syndicate (which owns the copyright to
Odie, and who had successfully sued Koons for infringement on
it).68 But Koons’ new copyright savvy did not keep him out of
legal hot water.
In 2000, Koons was commissioned to create a new series of
seven paintings for the Deutsche Guggenheim Museum in Berlin.69
Each work in the series dubbed “Easyfun-Ethereal” is essentially
an oil-painted collage.70
Koons collected images from
advertisements, scanned them into a computer, and digitally cutand-pasted selected, disembodied elements together over a
landscape background.71 The digital collages were then printed
and used by Koons’ assistants as templates for the final paintings.72
One painting in the series, Niagara, consists of images of women’s
lower legs and feet—two in shoes, two barefoot—dangling above a
tray of donuts and another of Danishes.73 Behind the feet is an
image of an enormous brownie topped with ice cream, and behind
that sits a landscape dominated by the image of Niagara Falls.74
According to Koons, the final painting was meant to “comment on
the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for food,

Longer Appropriate?, THE ART NEWSPAPER, May 9, 2012, available at
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate/26378 (explaining that
“‘appropriating’ other artists’ work without consent is still common, but savvier
practitioners know that permission is far less painful.”).
68
See Gilbert, supra note 67 (explaining that “‘hordes of people’” have granted Koons
permission to use their copyrighted material, including United Feature Syndicate).
69
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that Koon’s
Easyfun-Ethereal was commissioned in 2000 by Deutsche Bank and Guggenheim).
70
See id. at 247 (explaining that Koons gathered images from various sources to use as
paint templates for all seven paintings); John Hudson, Easyfun—Ethereal, CULTURE
WARS (2001), http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2001-08/koons.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2013).
71
See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247 (explaining that “Koons culled images from
advertisements or his own photographs, scanned them into a computer, and digitally
superimposed the scanned images against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.”).
72
See id. at 247 (describing that Koons “printed color images of the resulting collages
for his assistants to use as templates for applying paint to billboard-sized . . .
canvasses.”).
73
See id. (explaining that Niagara “depicts four pairs of women’s feet and lower legs
dangling over . . . a tray of donuts, and a tray of apple Danish pastries”).
74
See id. at 247.
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play, and sex—are mediated by popular images.”75 One of the
pairs of feet—the second pair from the left—was modeled on a
photograph taken by Andrea Blanch, “Silk Sandals by Gucci.”76
Blanch’s original photograph showed the woman’s feet resting on
a man’s lap in an airplane cabin. For her work, Blanch wanted to
“show some sort of erotic sense[;] . . . to get . . . more of a
sexuality to the photographs.”77 For Niagara, Koons reproduced
only the legs, feet, and shoes from Blanch’s photograph, adding a
heel to one of the shoes, altering their orientation, and slightly
modifying the coloring.78 Blanch discovered Koons’ use and filed
suit.79
Although again claiming fair use, Koons did not attempt in this
case to claim that his work was a parody.80 Rather, Koons argued
that his work was transformative.81 In his seminal 1990 article on
fair use, Judge Pierre Leval attempted to outline a permanent
framework upon which fair use cases might be adjudicated.82
Central to this framework is the notion of transformative use.83
Suggesting that transformation, which advances knowledge and the
progress of the arts, can be distinguished from repackaged free
riding, Leval argued:
I believe the answer to the question of justification
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative. The use must be
75

Id. (quoting Koons’ Affidavit).
See id. at 248–49.
77
Id. (quoting Blanch’s deposition).
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244
(2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-6433-CV) (“Koons moved for summary judgment, or in the
alternative partial summary judgment, on the following grounds: i) any claim based on
the creation and sale of the painting was barred by the statute of limitations; ii) there was
no infringement due to a lack of substantial similarity; iii) there was no infringement due
to the fair use privilege; iv) Blanch’s prayer for an award of punitive damages could not
be maintained as a matter of law and/or under any known facts.”).
81
See id. (arguing that the district court correctly determined that Koons’ use was
transformational).
82
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105
(1990).
83
See id. at 1111 (“I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily
on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.”).
76
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productive and must employ the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the
original. . . . If . . . the secondary use adds value to
the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw
material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and
understandings—this is the very type of activity that
the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society. . . . If a quotation of
copyrighted material reveals no transformative
purpose, fair use should perhaps be rejected without
further inquiry into the other factors. Factor One is
the soul of fair use.84
Judge Leval’s analysis served as the philosophical basis to the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, four
years later.85 Here, drawing on Leval’s framework and the legal
origin for fair use, Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Souter wrote:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in
Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely
“supersede[s] the objects” of the original
creation, (“supplanting” the original), or instead
adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is
“transformative.” Although such transformative use
is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair
use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright,
and the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like
84

Id. at 1111, 1116. Here, Leval contrasts the first factor of fair use with the Supreme
Court’s earlier claim that the fourth factor was “the single most important element of fair
use.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
85
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Leval, supra note 82, at 1111.).
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commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use.86
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose in many ways established the basis for
parody claims under fair use, and as a result conceptually tied up
issues of transformation with issues of parody.87 In Blanch v.
Koons, however, the court returned to the core of Leval’s theory
and separated the issues of parody and transformation, focusing
solely on the latter.88 The court noted, “[t]he sharply different
objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating,
‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative nature of the use.”89
Given the “distinct creative or communicative objectives”90 of
Koons and Blanch, respectively, the court decided Koons’ use was
transformative regardless of whether Niagara commented critically
in any substantive way on Blanch’s original photograph:
“‘Niagara’ . . . may be better characterized for these purposes as
satire—its message appears to target the genre of which ‘Silk
Sandals’ is typical, rather than the individual photograph itself.”91
Although the work was not found to be parodic, the transformative
nature of Koons’ painting was found to weigh the first factor of
fair use in its favor and trickled through the remaining factors in
much the same way that they would in a parody case.92 On this
basis, the court of appeals affirmed an earlier district court decision
that Koons’ use was fair.93
The death knell of appropriation art had, it seemed, had been
rung prematurely. Where the cases surrounding Koons’ “Banality
Show” had seemed to put the kibosh on unauthorized appropriation
art, the finding in Blanch v. Koons gave new hope to appropriation

86
87
88

Id. (internal citations omitted).
See id. (finding that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value”).
See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing transformative

use).
89

Id. at 252. The court also draws on Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley
Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) in which reproduced images of Grateful Dead concert
posters and tickets were found sufficiently transformative and ultimately fair when used
in a biography of the rock band.
90
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253.
91
Id. at 254.
92
See id. at 253 (concluding that the use in question was transformative).
93
Id. at 259.
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artists.94 And so, when Richard Prince was sued for copyright
infringement only a couple of years later, he had reason to be
optimistic.
Prince had become known for photographing others’
photographs—particularly
images
used
in
commercial
advertising—and presenting the results as his own work.95 In
2005, one of Prince’s “re-photographs” set an auction record,
selling for over $1 million.96 When Prince was sued, however, it
was (as with Koon’s Niagara) for a collage, and not for a
straightforward re-photograph.97 The case in question centered on
Prince’s work, Canal Zone (2007), a collage consisting of thirtyfive photographs from Yes, Rasta, a book of photographs by
Patrick Cariou depicting Jamaican Rastafarians. Prince had torn
out the photographs and pasted them onto a wooden board.98
Prince used some of Cariou’s photographs in their entirety,
cropped others, and painted ovoid splotches over some of the faces
depicted.99 The work was one of thirty created for the series
“Canal Zone,” all but one of which employ images from Yes,
Rasta.100 Motivated by a gallery’s cancellation of a planned show
of his work,101 Cariou filed for summary judgment.102 Prince
attempted to argue—as Koons had successfully—that his
94

See id. at, 264 (stating that where the court found “stronger considerations” existed
[in] “pointing toward a finding of fair use.”).
95
See GRANT B. ROMER, THE GETTY INSTITUTE, WHAT WAS PHOTOGRAPHY? 3 (2010)
(“[H]e has explained his ‘appropriation art’, which has made him famous. In the early
1980’s he began re-photographing advertisements featuring cowboys while working for
Time-Life in the tear-sheet department.”).
96
See id. at 2 (“On November 8th, 2005, Richard Prince’s Untitled (Cowboy) 1989,
set a world auction record, the first photograph to publicly sell for over a million
dollars…The ‘re-photograph’ of a magazine Marlboro cigarette advertisement, sold at
Christie’s Post-War/Contemporary Art auction for $1,248,000.”).
97
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F.Supp.2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y 2011); Cariou v. Prince, No.
11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
See id. at 344.
101
See id. (The show was “[c]ancelled by the gallery owner due to fears that she would
seem to be capitalizing on Prince’s success and notoriety, and worries about exhibiting
work that had been ‘done already’.”).,
102
See id. at 337 (“Defendants invite this Court to find that use of copyrighted materials
as raw materials in creating ‘appropriation art’ which does not comment on the
copyrighted original is a fair use.”).
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appropriation art was transformative and, on this basis, fair use.103
The district court, however, stated that it was “aware of no
precedent holding that such use is fair absent transformative
comment on the original.”104 Rather, it interpreted the finding of
Koons’ Niagara as transformative of Blanch’s photograph because
Koons “used it to comment on the role such advertisements play in
our culture and on the attitudes the original and other
advertisements like it promote.”105 Comparatively, the court found
that Prince’s appropriation was not in service of any
commentary—either with regard to Cariou’s works, or to the
broader culture of which they are a part.106 Where Koons and
Blanch had clearly distinct artistic aims, the court in Cariou v.
Prince found that Prince’s purpose was essentially the same as
Cariou’s: “a desire to communicate to the viewer core truths about
Rastafarians and their culture.”107 That is, while Prince intended
that his work be something new, “his intent was not transformative
within the meaning of Section 107.”108 And so the pendulum
seemed to have swung back in the other direction for appropriation
art.
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision
in part, finding that twenty-five of Prince’s offending works were
in fact fair. The remaining five works were remanded to the
district court to reconsider on the basis that the court of appeals set
out. Citing the reasoning in Blanch, the court of appeals argues
that, to be transformative, it is not necessary that a use comment on
the original—or, indeed, on anything else.109 Dismissing Prince’s
own stated intentions regarding his works as essentially irrelevant,
the court contends, “Prince’s works could be transformative even
without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even
without Prince’s stated intention to do so.”110 Instead, the court
103

See id. at 348.
Id.
105
Id.
106
See id. at 349 (“Prince did not intend to comment on any aspects of the original
works or on the broader culture.”).
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
110
Id.
104
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suggests, the central question is whether the new work is
transformative in the sense of adding “something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message.”111 And transformation in this
sense, the court argues, hangs on “how the artworks may
‘reasonably be perceived’.”112 The assumption here is that whether
a work is a new expression, has a new message, or is invested with
new meaning, is something that the work will wear on its face:
“Here, looking at the artworks and the photographs side-by-side,
we conclude that Prince’s images . . . have a different character,
give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and employ new
aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct from
Cariou’s.”113
And so the pendulum swings once again.
III. SOME STRATEGIES
A number of strategies have been suggested for how copyright
law—and, in particular, fair use—might accommodate
appropriation art. Perhaps the first such theorist, Patricia Krieg,
suggested that appropriation art constitutes a special form of
political discourse—acting as a “political symbol”114—and,
“[b]ecause political discourse lies at the very core of First
Amendment concerns, these images deserve the status of protected
speech.”115 Krieg elaborates:
Courts should extend First Amendment protection
to visual works which use appropriated images to
convey original expression, as this is consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of free artistic
expression. If the art work has significantly altered
or transformed the copyrighted material so that the
work as a whole adds meaning beyond that
111

Id.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Patricia Krieg, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565,
1578 (1984).
115
Id.
112
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conveyed by the context of the copyrighted image
alone, First Amendment protection is warranted.116
Krieg was writing several years before the finding of Rogers v.
Koons, and indeed several years before Judge Leval’s oft-quoted
paper, but her focus on transformation clearly predicts Leval’s
framework.117 Unfortunately, Krieg wraps up transformation in
the issue of free speech. Only a year after Krieg’s essay was
published, the Supreme Court determined that the limits of
copyright—including the confines of fair use—are consistent with
First Amendment protections.118 In other words, the First
Amendment cannot serve as a viable defense against complaints of
infringement.119
Also writing before the Koons cases, but at a time when
appropriation art seemed to be circling closer and closer to the
courts, John Carlin suggested modifying existing fair use standards
to better allow for appropriation art.120 Rejecting the standard
four-factor model, Carlin focuses on the purpose of the copying

116

Id. at 1584.
Compare id. (“If the art work has significantly altered or transformed the
copyrighted material so that the work as a whole adds meaning beyond that conveyed by
the context of the copyrighted image alone, First Amendment protection is warranted.”)
with Leval, supra note 82, at 1111 (“I believe the answer to the question of
justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is
transformative.”).
118
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 582
(1985); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003) (discussing that the
proximity in the time of the adoption of both the Copyright Clause and First Amendment
indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with
free speech principles).
119
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. According to the Court’s view, “the First
Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright.” Thus, the Court adds “whether verbatim copying from a public figure’s
manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must be judged according to the traditional
equities of fair use.” This explanation establishes that raising an additional defense in an
inquiry involving fairness would not proceed and must be address under fair use.
120
See Carlin, supra note 27, at 138 (explaining that in some situations flexibility of
fair use should be modify to allow innovative artistic expression).
117
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and the nature of the work copied.121 Carlin suggests, first, that an
appropriation artist’s commercial interests should not determine a
finding of fair use, but rather that the question hangs on “whether
or not there is willful interference with another’s commercial
interests.”122 Second, Carlin looks to whether the image copied is
a part of a shared cultural vocabulary—whether the particular
image appropriated is recognizable to the average viewer.123
Third, Carlin would require that, for an appropriation to be deemed
fair, the artist behind the original work be no longer living, or at
least no longer actively exhibiting his work.124 Finally, Carlin
suggests that singular works of appropriation be deemed
presumptively fair, while works of appropriation in multiple copies
be subject to further investigation.125
Carlin’s approach, while extremely interesting, runs into some
problems. In general, Carlin’s suggested framework seems jerrybuilt to handle the particular cases of appropriation that he has in
mind, leaving little room for other forms of art appropriation.126
As E. Kenly Ames notes, Koons’ String of Puppies, though not a
willful interference with Rogers’ commercial interests, would
likely not have fared well under Carlin’s system: first, the image
probably would not have been immediately recognizable to an
average viewer; second, Rogers was at the time of Koons’
appropriation still a working artist; and third, Koons created four
editions of his sculpture.127 Koons’ other works, as well as
Prince’s Canal Zone, would seem to encounter similar problems

121
See id. at 138–39 (“This is done to distinguish purely commercial appropriation
from that having artistic legitimacy.”).
122
Id. at 139.
123
See id.
124
See id.
125
See id. at 129–30, 135–36.
126
See Ames, supra note 67, at 1514 (“Appropriation of an unknown work is no more
likely to have a detrimental effect on the original artist’s incentive to create than is
appropriation of a well-known work. To draw this boundary as Carlin does is to chill
expression in the same manner, although admittedly not to the same degree, as the current
fair use doctrine does.”).
127
See id. at 1513. Ames further suggests that Carlin’s system “arbitrarily privileges
the work of established artists over that of fledgling artists.” Id. This, however, seems
questionable.
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under Carlin’s framework.128 Granted, Carlin did not have the
advantage of such legal hindsight, but with these cases in mind, it
seems his system offers no greater advantage to appropriation
artists, and is no less convoluted, than the existing system.129
Like Carlin, Ames seeks a specialized approach to fair use for
cases of artistic appropriation.130 Writing after Rogers but before
Blanch, Ames seeks to distinguish appropriation art from parody,
noting a particular disparity between what she sees as their
respective functions, but establishing an approach which parallels
the traditional approach to parody under fair use and in many ways
predicting the outcome in Blanch.131 First, looking to the purpose
and character of use, Ames suggests that for a work of
appropriation art to be presumptively fair, it should be a work of
visual art, as defined under the Visual Artists’ Rights Act of
1990.132 Second, Ames suggests that, to be fair, “an artist’s use of
an appropriated image in a work of visual art should create a
presumption that the work is created for the purpose of social
criticism or commentary.”133 Regarding the nature of the work
copied, Ames, unlike Carlin, does not limit the sources for
appropriation to well-known images.134 Rather, Ames allows for
appropriation of “existing images that are representative of a
particular type of genre of popular expression,” where “the
reasonable observer would recognize the image as being of a

128

Though Wild Boy and Puppy would have had the advantage of including a
recognizable character of popular culture, and Niagara and Canal Zone exist in only
single copies.
129
See Ames, supra note 67, at 1513
130
See id. at 1518.
131
See id. (“Existing fair use doctrine was designed, and is adequate, to handle all but
the most extreme subset of derivative uses. It was not, however, designed to handle the
very limited number of uses for which partial copying of the original work is not a viable
option and in which the relationship between appropriator and copyright holder is as
likely to be adversarial as that between parodist and copyright holder.”).
132
See id. at 1518–19. This restriction is suggested by Ames for two reasons: 1) to
“ensure that a copyright holder’s image will not turn up on mass-produced and massmarketed consumer goods, about whose critical purpose one would be quite skeptical;
and 2) to avoid any need to decide whether it is “good art,” or even “art” at all, or
whether it is successful in getting its critical message across to the viewer.” Id.
133
Id. at 1519.
134
See id. at 1514.
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particular type or genre of images.”135 Noting that the secondary
artist may need to appropriate an entire visual work in order to
convey her critical message, Ames suggests no limit to the amount
of the original copied, and further suggests that the secondary artist
not be required to directly criticize the work copied: “The ability to
criticize and comment on the values and practices of society on a
sweeping scale is the special attribute of appropriation.”136
Finally, regarding the effect on the potential market for the original
work, Ames suggests that such appropriation should be deemed
fair so long as the secondary work cannot reasonably function as a
market substitute for the original.137
Roxana Badin offers an approach that is largely in line with
Ames’, particularly as regards the issue of social commentary,
which both take to be central to the project of appropriation art.138
In general, Badin suggests that appropriation art performs a
communicative function, leading to the public benefit of a “more
direct relationship between the creative arts and popular culture,
inevitably increasing the public’s exposure to the arts.”139
Focusing on cases in which artists appropriate common,
recognizable objects and imagery of popular culture (“soup cans,
flags, cigarette packages, money, movie stars, comic strips and
even shopping bags”140), Badin recommends a notion of
“transformative use” expanded to recognize the “allegorical
strategy” of appropriation art and so to allow for their fair use.141
By “allegorical strategy,” Badin is referring to the
recontextualization of recognizable images by artists so as to invest
those images with new meaning.142 In the case of appropriation
art, Badin suggests this new meaning takes the form of social

135

Id. at 1521.
Id. at 1522.
137
See id. at 1524–25.
138
See Badin, supra note 53, at 1654–56 (1995) (explaining that the “creative
significance of all forms of appropriation . . . derives from its ability to speak critically of
the society in which both the public and the artist live.”).
139
See id. at 1655.
140
Id. at 1656.
141
See id. at 1684.
142
See id. at 1668.
136
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commentary.143 The image gains new meaning, Badin argues, by
forcing the viewer to reevaluate her understanding of the image.144
It is this reorientation of our evaluative practices, she suggests, that
makes all art—and not merely appropriation art—valuable.145
Badin further contends that “[p]ostmodern artists deliberately
abstain from altering the appropriated symbol or adding stylistic
marks that would identify the artist’s authorship in the piece
because, by principle, the symbol’s own vocabulary is the means
by which the artist conveys the allegorical message,”146 treating
images of popular culture as “parables of conspicuous
consumption.”147
Both Ames and Badin provide interesting analyses and offer
interesting strategies, but both err in applying a universal
philosophy to appropriation art, using this as the foundation upon
which to accommodate appropriation art within copyright law.
IV. THE AIMS OF APPROPRIATION ART
Appropriation—the taking from artistic and other sources—for
a new work is, as many will tell you, nearly as old as art itself.148
Some artists have employed such takings to build on previous
works, many to study those works, others to comment on them,
and some simply to steal.149 But Shakespeare, though he took
many of his plots from other sources,150 cannot reasonably be
called an “appropriation artist” in the sense that Koons and Prince
are so called. Nor does it seem reasonable to label Vincent van
Gogh an appropriation artist in the relevant sense, though he
copied and adapted nearly two dozen works by Jean-Francois

143

See id. at 1687.
See id. at 1660.
145
See id. at 1660.
146
Id. at 1661.
147
Id. at 1660.
148
See id. at 1657.
149
See Willajeanne F. McLean, All’s Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use
Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 385 (1993).
150
See Badin, supra note 53, at 1654 n.5
144
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Millet into paintings in his own inimitable style.151 Pablo Picasso
reinterpreted (and, in a sense, recreated) Velasquez’ Las Meninas
(1656) in a series of 58 paintings,152 but it would be similarly
difficult to call Picasso an appropriation artist. Although each of
these artists has appropriated in one sense or another, if we are to
talk about the contemporary art-historical category of
appropriation art, we cannot simply reduce it to appropriation—
taking—as an artistic method.
Neither, however, can we describe the contemporary category
of appropriation art on the basis that it is essentially a form of
social commentary. Ames contends that “[w]hile societal criticism
is usually incidental to traditional parody, it is the avowed purpose
of appropriationist visual art.”153 Badin’s view is even narrower:
“Appropriation in contemporary art has been defined as an
allegorical process through which the artist uses symbols of
popular culture as parables of conspicuous consumption.”154
Certainly, this seems true of much of Koons’ work, but it does not
describe Koons’ appropriationist work in its entirety, and it
certainly does not describe the contemporary category of
appropriation art as a whole.155 Probably the most celebrated of
the appropriation artists is Sherrie Levine, who only very rarely
appropriates from popular culture sources. Instead, Levine
appropriates from other artists, such as Walker Evans, Alfred
Stieglitz, and Kasimir Malevich.156 Sturtevant, who set the
contemporary movement in motion, appropriated from her artistic

151
See Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright As Knowledge Law, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 837 (2010).
152
See HANS BELTING, THE INVISIBLE MASTERPIECE 357 (Helen Atkins, trans., Reaktion
Books 2001 (1998).
153
Ames, supra note 67, at 1500.
154
Badin, supra note 53, at 1660. Here, Badin cites Benjamin H.D. Buchloh,
Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art, 21
ARTFORUM 43, 46 (1981), though it is worth noting that Buchloh does not actually give
this as a definition.
155
See Greenberg, supra note 64, at 31.
156
See
Sherri
Levine,
GUGGENHEIM,
http://www.guggenheim.org/newyork/collections/collection-online/show-full/bio/?artist_name=Sherrie%20Levine
(last
visited Feb. 1, 2013) (“Levine extended her strategy of appropriation . . . when she
rephotographed works by famous photographers including . . . Walker Evans.”).
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contemporaries.157 Neither Levine nor Sturtevant seems centrally
interested in popular culture, “conspicuous consumption,” or the
sort of societal criticism Ames discusses. And, in the case of
Canal Zone at least, Prince “did not intend to comment on any
aspects of the original works or on the broader culture.”158
If we were to attempt to describe the contemporary movement
of appropriation art in broad strokes, I would suggest that what
links these artists is the employment of appropriation in pursuit of
artistic projects focused on the art object—the nature of the thing
(in both the original and secondary works)—and the nature of
authorship.
In many ways, appropriation art is about
appropriation: the viewer is meant to know that the objects and
images presented are appropriated, and this is meant to say
something about the objects and the authorship of the original and
new works. Lynne A. Greenberg suggests, “[t]hese artists likewise
strive to erase all authorship from their work, replacing individual
signature with the trademarks of mass-produced commodities. In
so doing, they radically deny the notion of ‘creative authorship’ as
a principle and as a definitional codification for works of art.”159
While this is true of, say, Levine,160 Sturtevant considered her
works “original Sturtevants” while openly acknowledging their
sources.161 Prince’s general strategy is, if anything, the opposite of
Levine’s. Where Levine makes her sources explicit in the titles of
her works, Prince treats his sources as authorless and himself as
the author.162 Speaking of his re-photographs of magazine
advertisements, Prince says:

157

See Irvin, supra note 20, at 123.
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (SDNY 2011).
159
Greenberg, supra note 64, at 6; see also Carlin, supra note 24, at 129 n.106.
(“Appropriation transcends parody because it is a well-grounded and conscious attack on
traditional notions of originality and authorship in art. Appropriation is one of the most
important conceptual strategies in late twentieth-century art because it underscores the
role of the artist as the manipulator or modifier of existing material, rather than as the
inventor or creator of new forms.”).
160
See Irvin, supra note 20, at 123–24.
161
Elisa Schaar, Spinoza in Vegas, Sturtevant Everywhere: A Case of Critical (Re-)
Discoveries and Artistic Self-Reinventions, 33 ART HISTORY 886, 890 (2010).
162
See Brian Appel, Richard Prince, ROVE TV (2007), available at
http://www.rovetv.net/pr-interview.html.
158
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I like to think about making it again instead of
making it new . . . Advertising images aren’t really
associated with an author—more with a
product/company and for the most part put out or
“art directed.” They kind of end up having a life of
their own. It’s not like you’re taking them from
anyone. Pages in a magazine are more often
thought of as “collage.” When I re-photographed
these pages they became “real” photographs.163
In another interview, Prince elaborates:
They were like these authorless pictures, too good
to be true, art-directed and over-determined and
pretty-much like film stills, psychologically hypedup and having nothing to do with the way art
pictures were traditionally “put” together. I mean
they were so off the map, so hard to look at, and
rather than tear them out of the magazines and paste
them up on a board, I thought why not rephotograph them with a camera and then put them
in a real frame with a mat board around the picture
just like a real photograph and call them mine.164
Prince revels in his authorship while denying it to the art from
which he appropriates.165
It is at best difficult to attempt to draw lines to clearly
distinguish one artistic movement from all others, and it would be
equally difficult to fully and clearly explain any given artistic
project or artist’s body of work. Nevertheless, Sturtevant, Levine,
Koons, and Prince—despite differences in their respective goals
and views—are involved in substantially similar projects, projects
unlike those of Shakespeare, Van Gogh, and Picasso.166 However,
the lines that separate appropriation art from other movements are
163

Id.
Jeff Rian, In the Picture: Jeff Rian in Conversation with Richard Prince, in
RICHARD PRINCE 6, 12 (2003).
165
See id.; Appel, supra note 162.
166
See KENNETH GOLDSMITH, UNCREATIVE WRITING 109–18 (2011); MARJORIE
PERLOFF, UNORIGINAL GENIUS: POETRY BY OTHER MEANS IN THE NEW CENTURY 146–50
(2010).
164
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certainly blurry. Does Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919)—a postcard
of the Mona Lisa upon which Duchamp penciled a moustache and
goatee—qualify as appropriation art?
Roy Lichtenstein’s
enormous Pop-Art reproductions of comic-book panels certainly
seem to come close. And what of Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades
Project (1940)—a 1,000-page literary collage—or Kenneth
Goldsmith’s Day (2003), a word-for-word retyping of the
September 1, 2000 issue of the New York Times? Ames restricts
her analysis—and, indeed, membership in the category of
appropriation art—to the visual arts, but there seems to be a clear
fraternity with these “conceptual writers,” as they have been
dubbed.167 Like Koons and Prince, they trace their conceptual
origins to Duchamp and Barthes, and focus on the art object and
the nature of authorship. Their projects are very much about
appropriation.
V. APPROPRIATION AND TRANSFORMATION
As noted above, the court in Rogers v. Koons states, “[i]f an
infringer of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use
solely on the basis of the infringer’s claim to a higher or different
artistic use—without insuring public awareness of the original
work—there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use
defense.”168 This is, on its face, a compelling slippery-slope
argument: without any such boundary, what wouldn’t be allowable
as fair use? Impressed by this argument, the district court in
Cariou sought a principled break to keep copyright from sliding
into oblivion.169
The court states that Prince’s “intent was not transformative
within the meaning of Section 107.”170 This was an odd choice of
words, however, given that transformation is not once mentioned
in § 107 of the Copyright Act (the section devoted to the fair use
doctrine).171 Indeed, the notion of transformation is raised only
167
168
169
170
171

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 166, at 109–18; PERLOFF, supra note 166, at 146–50.
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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once in the whole of the Act: in § 101, in the definition of
“derivative work.”172 And so it is perhaps even odder still that the
court drew this particular line in the sand: “Prince’s Paintings are
transformative only to the extent that they comment on [Cariou’s]
Photos; to the extent they merely recast, transform, or adapt the
Photos, Prince’s Paintings are instead infringing derivative
works.”173 The court as such appears to be making a distinction
between “mere transformation” (with regard to derivative works)
and a special sort of transformation-as-commentary (in the domain
of fair use).174 Although this does draw a principled break on the
slippery slope, the distinction employs a rather strange use of
“transformative.” While it is at the courts’ discretion to introduce
terms of law with specialized meanings in the legal domain, this is
certainly not how “transformative” is used by Leval nor by the
court in Blanch v. Koons, nor does it seem an intuitive use of the
term.175 Rather, it appears to be an ad hoc definition solely
invented by the court in Cariou to stop the slide towards copyright
anarchy.176
The appeals court, too, found this reasoning flawed, and
introduced instead a stance on transformation disconnected from
matters of intent. The court suggests, “[w]hat is critical is how the
work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not simply
what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of
work.”177 However, the suggestion that transformativeness lies in
“how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived’”178 is more
complicated than it may at first appear. As the court notes, the
audience for Prince’s work is very different from that of
172
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications,
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”).
173
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
174
See id.
175
Compare id., with Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992), and Leval,
supra note 82.
176
Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
177
Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
178
Id.
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Cariou’s.179 And when the court reduces the question of
transformation to how the work would appear to a “reasonable
observer,” it fails to ask whether this observer is a member of
Prince’s audience, or of Cariou’s, both, or neither. Even where the
original and the secondary work appear visually indistinguishable,
the audience familiar with the aims and practices of appropriation
art will treat them very differently, and in many cases, they are
likely to find something new—a new meaning, a fundamentally
different aesthetic. And much of this will turn precisely on what
the artist says about his work.
In the end, the court leaves open what qualifies as a “new
expression” or the employment of “new aesthetics,” instead
passing that burden on to an abstract “reasonable observer,” and
so, rather than providing a solution to the problem, only pushes the
problem back a level.
Exactly what constitutes “transformation” in the law remains
an open question. On the understanding that appearance alone
cannot do the job, Ames and Badin attempt to ground
transformation in context. Ames asserts, “What makes an image
unique—what a reproduction cannot capture—is the context of the
image. Meaning is dependent on context.”180 Badin elaborates:
By placing a universal object such as Duchamp’s
Ready-made in the context of a gallery, the artist
simultaneously appropriates a sign’s already laden
popular significance and reinvests new meaning in
the object as testament to the vices or virtues of
modern society. Shifting the context of the image
in this way transforms the meaning of the original
image by forcing the viewer to reevaluate his or her
former, most often unconscious, understanding of
the image.181
Change in context, on this view, brings about a change in
meaning—a transformation in the work. Context alone, however,
does not change a work, though a change in context might alter its
179
180
181

Id. (“Prince’s audience is very different from Cariou’s”)
Ames, supra note 67, at 1481.
Badin, supra note 53, at 1660.
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significance to us. Taking a tribal African mask and placing it in
an art gallery alongside primitivist works by Matisse and Picasso
might alter how we look at or think about the mask, but it does not
change the work (nor does it change those by Matisse and Picasso).
Whatever was intrinsically true of the mask before its change in
context remains true after, and whatever was false remains false.182
We might be more aware of the work’s subtle lines, or of the
relation it bears to contemporary Western art, but if these are
properties of the mask, they were properties of the mask before we
discovered them. If it were true that context alone changed a work,
then moving a sculpture from one room to another would result in
a new or altered sculpture, and this surely isn’t the case.
That being said, something happens when Duchamp selects a
urinal and makes it art, when a collagist combines preexisting
images together, or when Levine re-photographs an image created
by Walker Evans and presents it as a new work. This is not simply
a matter of context, however. Rather, the artist (Duchamp, the
collagist, or Levine) employs the preexisting object as a means of
expressing some new and distinct idea.
Copyright protects expressions, and not the ideas expressed.183
However, expressions and ideas are not so neatly divisible as the
law would sometimes like to pretend. If we take an idea to be,
roughly, the content of a thought, feeling, emotion, desire, and/or
other cognitive state or event, and an expression to be the
manifestation or embodiment of such an idea or ideas in a
perceptible form, then ‘expression’ will always be an ellipsis for
“expression-of-an-idea” or “expression-of-ideas.”184 There are no
bare expressions—expressions that do not express ideas; such a
182

Of course, its relational properties may be so altered. It is now true of the mask that
it sits beside a Picasso sculpture, where this was false of it before.
183
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work”). See generally Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879) (originally giving rise to the idea/expression dichotomy, today encoded in
the Copyright Act of 1976).
184
See Darren Hudson Hick, Making Sense of the Copyrightability of Plots: A Case
Study in the Ontology of Art, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 399, 402 (2009). Under
“ideas,” here, I would include ideas about facts.
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thing simply is not an expression, whatever it may be. And so, any
expression will be indexical to its idea, though a given idea might
be expressed in multiple ways.185 Likewise, the same image,
textual string, or series of notes may be used to express entirely
disparate ideas.186
As such, if two expressions, however
indistinguishable, express two distinct ideas, they are (perhaps all
appearances to the contrary) two distinct expressions, strictly
speaking. And, just as I might imbue an ordinary urinal with an
idea by transforming it into art (through perhaps little more than
intending it to be treated as art),187 so too can I use another’s
image, textual string, or series of notes to express some new idea
of mine, thereby shedding or adding to the ideas expressed in the
image, text, or notes by the original author. Strictly speaking,
these will be distinct expressions, even if visually, textually, or
sonically indistinguishable.188
Of course, if the original image, text, or musical work is
copyrighted, and I use that image, text, or other work without
185
See Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 10 PACE L. REV. 551, 553 (1990).
186
This, allowing for possible exceptions where an idea is expressible in only one way.
In the parlance of copyright law, this idea and its expression will have “merged.” See
Baker, 101 U.S. at 106 (holding that if an idea can only be expressed in one or a small
number of ways, copyright law will not protect the expression because it has “merged”
with the idea); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967)
(establishing the principle that where a work is so simple and so straightforward as to
leave available only a limited number of forms of expression of the substance of the
subject matter, the expression would be uncopyrightable); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (as long as a defendant only takes the uncopyrightable
elements of a plaintiff’s work, the two works will not be substantially similar enough to
constitute copyright infringement).
187
See generally Jerrold Levinson, Defining Art Historically, 19 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS
232 (1979) (arguing that a thing is art in virtue of its creator’s intention that it be treated
or regarded as past works were treated or regarded); GEORGE DICKIE, THE ART CIRCLE: A
THEORY OF ART (1984) (suggesting that an item becomes art in virtue of its role in a
wider institution of art).
188
As the law recognizes that two authors might independently and coincidentally
string together the same words in the same order, and so treats these as two distinct and
copyrightable expressions under the law—each being “original” to its author—my theory
here is less strange than it may initially appear. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The ‘author’ is entitled to a copyright if he
independently contrived a work completely identical with what went before; similarly,
although he obtains a valid copyright, he has no right to prevent another from publishing
a work identical with his, if not copied from his.”).
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permission, the result will be a case of prima facie copyright
infringement.189 That is, although my creation will be a distinct
expression from that work from which I have appropriated—even
if it is visually, textually, or sonically indistinguishable from it—
this alone will not shield me from a claim of infringement, nor will
it guarantee that my creation is copyrightable.190 In the relatively
simple case in which I have, for instance, photographed someone
else’s photograph (as Levine and Prince have done on numerous
occasions), then everything in my resulting work owes its origin to
the original photographer. Since nothing in the expression is
original to me, the work will not pass the minimum bar of
originality required for copyrightability.191 As far as the law is
concerned, my photograph will simply be an instance of the
original work.192 Nevertheless, if I am employing the image in
service of expressing some distinct idea, it will be, strictly
speaking, a distinct expression. Without formally altering the
original, I will nevertheless have transformed it. Of course, I
might also express some new idea by borrowing from a preexisting
work and formally modifying it in the process.193 Where my
creation would constitute a new work, insofar as it involves a
recasting, transformation, or adaptation of an existing copyrighted
work, it will also be a derivative work and so (if created without
permission of the original copyright holder) a prima facie violation
of the derivative works right.194 To recall:

189

See 17 U.S.C. § 1309 (2006) (establishing originality as an element of the prima
facie case for copyright infringement).
190
See id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
191
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 US 53, 58 (1884) (stating that the
Constitution covers works as long as they are representations of “original intellectual
conceptions of the author”); see also Darren Hudson Hick, Toward an Ontology of
Authored Works, 51 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 185, 195 (2011).
192
See Hick, supra note 191, at 194.
193
See id. at 192.
194
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (among the six exclusive rights recognized in the
copyright owner is the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work”).
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A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical
arrangement,
dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording,
art
reproduction,
abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
“derivative work.”195
This returns us, then, to the central clash between
transformative derivative works and transformation as the basis of
fair use claims. It is certainly odd that one aspect of copyright law
(the derivative works right) takes transformation to be sufficient
for a finding of infringement, while another aspect of the law (the
fair use doctrine) takes transformation as a core ingredient in
nullifying such a charge.196 What does transformation mean in the
context of derivative works?
Not surprisingly, there is
disagreement here as well.
The court of appeals in Cariou states, “A secondary work may
modify the original without being transformative. For instance, a
derivative work that merely presents the same material but in a
new form, such as a book of synopses of [television] shows, is not
transformative.”197 On this view, the issue seems to be whether the
work is transformative enough, or in the right way—that merely
derivative works do not have a “new expression” or “employ new
aesthetics.” Whether this is meant to be a difference merely in
degree, or a difference in kind, is not clear. Either way, however,
it seems very odd to suggest that the difference between a work
and a written summary of that work does not so qualify. Although
all too many students will happily read synopses, say, of
Shakespeare’s plays, rather than the originals, I think we can all
agree that Hamlet and the CliffsNotes summary of the same differ

195
196
197

See id. § 101 (emphasis added).
See id. § 107.
Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
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wildly in their aesthetic character. And although Seinfeld might
not rise to the level of Shakespeare, the same principle would seem
to hold here.
The court in Castle Rock v. Carol Publishing stated that
“derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation.”198
The court in Warner Bros. v. RDR Books states, “[t]he statutory
language seeks to protect works that are ‘recast, transformed, or
adapted’ into another medium, mode, language, or revised version,
while still representing the ‘original work of authorship.’”199 These
are still fairly high-order analyses, however, which would require
substantial unpacking of their own. What is a “mode of
presentation”? What constitutes a “revised version”? Paul
Goldstein argues that a derivative work is created through
transformation whenever it creates a “new work for a different
market.”200 But what constitutes this creation of a “new work”? In
the case of Mirage v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., the court of appeals
found that affixing copyrighted photographs, cut from a book, to
ceramic tiles creates a violating derivative work:
By removing the individual images from the book
and placing them on the tiles, perhaps the appellant
has not accomplished reproduction. We conclude,
though, that appellant has certainly recast or
transformed the individual images by incorporating
them into its tile-preparing process.201
However, less than a decade later, in a case nearly identical in
substance, the court in Lee v. A.R.T. Co. argued that simply
mounting a note card on a tile backing does not result in a
derivative work:
[T]he copyrighted note cards and lithographs were
not “transformed” in the slightest. The art was

198

Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998).
Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
200
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.3.1 (2nd ed.,
1996).
201
Mirage v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
199
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bonded to a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed
in the process. It still depicts exactly what it
depicted when it left Lee’s studio. If mounting
works is a “transformation,” then changing a
painting’s frame or a photograph’s mat equally
produces a derivative work.202
That is, since we do not want to say that the mere reframing of
a work constitutes the creation of a new, derivative work,
transformation cannot consist in this.203 But, to dig a little further
into the issue, let us consider another series of works by Jeff
Koons.
For his 1985 “Equilibrium” exhibition, Koons purchased Nike
posters from the manufacturer—two of each—framed them, and
presented them as his own works.204 The original posters created
by brothers Tock and John Costacos depict 1980s sports icons in
quasi-mythic poses.205 The Costacos Brothers’ poster of basketball
legend Moses Malone, for instance, shows the player holding a
staff and parting a sea of basketballs over a legend reading
“MOSES.”206 Koons’ work, Moses, consists of a copy of the
original poster in a simple wooden frame.207 The frame was not
incidental to the work, however. Koons notes: “The framing was
very important. I spent a lot of time choosing the material and the
color.”208 The frame is a part of Koons’ work, and not merely a
202

Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d at 1343 (holding that by borrowing and
mounting preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the consent of the
copyright proprietors, appellant had prepared a derivative work and infringed the
proprietors’ copyrights).
204
See Tamara Warren, New Exhibit: The Costacos Brothers For the Kids, FORBES
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tamarawarren/2012/01/18/new-exhibit-thecostacos-brothers-for-the-kids/ (“For “Equilibrium” Koons appropriated images from
Nike poster advertisements . . . .”).
205
See id. (“The Nike posters [depict images] in which the sports stars are shown to
have supernatural abilities.”).
206
See Jeffrey Koons’ Basketball Poster Switch-Up, Bread City Basketball,
http://breadcity.org/tag/costacos-brothers/ (depicting the original Costacos Brothers’
poster of Moses Malone).
207
See Jeff Koons-Moses, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/lot/jeffkoons-moses-1789213-details.aspx?intObjectID=1789213 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013)
(showing Koon’s work that sold at auction).
208
JEFF KOONS, JEFF KOONS: PICTURES 1980–2002 19 (Thomas Kellein, ed., 2002)
203
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means of displaying the Costacos Brothers’ poster—it was selected
and arranged with the poster as essential to the work.209
Certainly, there is something interesting going on here. At the
very least, Koons thinks he has created a new work. Offering an
interpretation of Moses, he says:
Equilibrium is unattainable, it can be sustained only
for a moment. And here are these people in the role
of saying, “Come on! I’ve done it! I’m a star! I’m
Moses!” It’s about artists using art for social
mobility. Moses [Malone] is a symbol of the
middle-class artist of our time who does the same
act of deception, a front man: “I’ve done it! I’m a
star!”210
“People were shocked,” Koons reports, “that I was asking 1000
dollars for a framed Nike poster.”211 But Koons was not merely
selling a copy of the Costacos Brothers’ poster; he was selling an
edition of his work, Moses. And Koons isn’t the only one who
sees it this way. The original Nike poster of Moses Malone
occasionally shows up for sale on eBay for about forty dollars.
One of the two editions of Koons’ Moses sold at auction in 2004
for $78,000.212 To buy a copy of the original poster is certainly not
to purchase an edition of Koons’ work.213 Moses is in part
composed of the original poster, but Koons’ work is something
distinct from it, in the same way that Duchamp’s Fountain is

209

See Darren Hudson Hick, Finding a Foundation: Copyright and the Creative Act, 17
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 363, 376 (2009).
210
Klaus Ottman, Jeff Koons, 1 J. CONTEMPORARY ART 18 (1988), available at
http://www.jca-online.com/koons.html.; see also Katy Siegel, Jeff Koons Talks to Katy
Siegel, 41 ARTFORUM 252, 253 (2003).
211
KOONS, supra note 208, at 19.
212
Stephen Perloff, Lambert Sale a Smashing Success as Records Fall for Contemp
Work, 82 E-PHOTO NEWSLETTER, December 10, 2004, available at
http://www.iphotocentral.com/news/article_view.php/88/82/441.
213
Although I am centrally restricting my discussion in this article to the issue of
transformation, this matter also bears on the fourth factor of fair use: the effect of the
secondary use on the market value of the original. On the interpretation that uses which
suppress sales of the original are allowable while those that usurp the sales of the original
are not, no reasonable person simply seeking to obtain a copy of the Nike poster would
purchase a copy of Koons’ work at several thousand times the original poster’s price.
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distinct from the porcelain urinal of which it is composed.214 Put
simply, while the Nike poster is about Moses Malone, Koons’
work is about (among other things) the Nike poster itself (and,
importantly, this could be true even if Koons had not selected a
frame, but had simply appropriated the poster itself). Insofar as
what the work is about is, at least in part, determined by the idea
expressed in that work, Koons’ work expresses an idea distinct
from that of the original, and so, as an expression is indexical to its
idea, Koons’ expression is, strictly speaking, distinct from that of
the Costacos Brothers. And so, in this sense, Koons has
transformed the original work.
VI. A PROPOSAL
Whether some work is independently copyrightable depends
centrally upon whether it constitutes an original work of
authorship, and this is established within the law on formal and
causal grounds.215 That is, a work constitutes an original work of
authorship if it is formally distinct from all preexisting works, or
includes material not copied from any preexisting work, assuming
that what sets the new work apart from others meets a fairly
If an item is formally
minimal bar of originality.216
indistinguishable from, and is entirely copied from, some work,
then that item simply counts as an instance of that preexisting
work.217 As such, although I argue that two works will constitute
different expressions, strictly speaking, so long as they are
employed as expressions of distinct ideas (even if the resulting
expressions are visually, textually, or sonically indistinguishable),
where one is entirely and completely copied from the other, the
newer of the works would not qualify as “original” within the law,
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See Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 571 (1964).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”).
216
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
217
For a more detailed analysis see Hick, supra note 191.
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and so would not be independently copyrightable.218 However, to
whatever degree the new work appropriates from the preexisting
work, where the new work is used to express some distinct idea, I
would suggest that such a use be recognized as transformative and
so presumptively fair.
As a finding of fair use does not in itself recognize a copyright
in the new expression, the appropriation artist who entirely and
accurately copies her work from some preexisting work will obtain
no right to make further copies of the work, nor to license further
derivative works based upon it.219 Rather, she will gain only a
finding of fair use in her copy.220 Where the new expression is not
entirely copied from preexisting works, the appropriation artist
would gain copyright ownership in what was not copied,221 where
this new material itself meets the law’s minimum bar of originality
(there is, after all, a back-side to String of Puppies), with all of the
associated rights thereof.222 However, as with cases of complete
appropriation, the use here should be found to be fair where it is
employed in the expression of an idea distinct from that of the
original.
On this understanding, there is no essential difference between
the notion of transformation employed in the definition of
“derivative work” and that employed in fair use evaluation. Where
a new work is based on a transformation of some preexisting work,
it will constitute a derivative work (on the condition that it
constitutes a new work at all under the law). But where this
transformation is in service of expressing some distinct idea, this
use will be presumptively fair.
Now, what of the slippery slope worry raised in Rogers v.
Koons—that, if a use could be judged fair solely on the basis that
218

See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC., 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
220
See id.
221
See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2006) (“The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material.”).
222
This would do little for Prince in the case of Canal Zone, however, as nearly every
part of the work is copied from some work of Cariou’s, leaving him little to further copy
or license.
219
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the secondary user claims a higher or different artistic purpose,
there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense?223
Where this purpose constitutes the expression of a new idea,
however, isn’t the promotion of this the avowed purpose of
copyright law? The Constitutional foundation to copyright states,
“The Congress shall have power [. . .] to Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”224 As standardly interpreted, the right of copyright
exists to promote the progress of mankind’s body of knowledge,
or, as Donald Diefenbach puts it, “to expand the marketplace of
ideas.”225
Isn’t this precisely what Koons and the other
appropriation artists are attempting to do? While copyrightability
rests centrally on an author’s expression, and not on her ideas
expressed, I would suggest that, given the intended function of
copyright law in general and the fair use doctrine in particular, it is
worth considering a secondary author’s ideas in determining
whether her use is fair. And while it would perhaps be ideal on
this understanding to require for a finding of fair use that the
secondary work express some new idea, such a requirement would
undoubtedly place an enormous burden on the law.226 Instead, I
suggest only for such a use to be presumptively fair that the
secondary use be in service of expressing some idea distinct from
that of the original. However, my proposal still requires a fairly
high degree of sensitivity on the part of the courts.
In the case of Cariou v. Prince, the district court found that
Prince’s purpose in creating Canal Zone was the same as that of
Cariou’s in the original photographs: to “communicate to the
viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture.”227 What
the court failed to consider important was whether Cariou and
Prince sought to communicate the same core truths, and this seems
a critical matter. Both purposes and ideas can be described in
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See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
225
Donald L. Diefenbach, The Constitutional and Moral Justifications for Copyright, 8
PUB. AFFAIRS. Q. 225, 226 (1994).
226
I advanced an even more stringent proposal in Hick, supra note 47, at 415–20.
227
Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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varying degrees of specificity, and at an abstract enough level all
authored works perform the same function: expression. However,
it is very often the more detailed, nuanced levels that interest us,
that expand the marketplace of ideas. Are the ideas expressed in
Canal Zone importantly distinct from those expressed in Yes,
Rasta? Here, the court notes:
In creating the Paintings, Prince did not intend to
comment on any aspects of the original works or on
the broader culture. Prince’s intent in creating the
Canal Zone paintings was to pay homage or tribute
to other painters, including Picasso, Cezanne,
Warhol, and de Kooning, and to create beautiful
artworks which related to musical themes and to a
post-apocalyptic screenplay he was writing which
featured a reggae band.
Prince intended to
emphasize themes of equality of the sexes; highlight
“the three relationships in the world, which are men
and women, men and men, and women and
women”; and portray a contemporary take on the
music scene.228
How the court could reduce this to a purpose to “communicate
to the viewer core truths about Rastafarians and their culture”
boggles the mind, and clearly for my proposal to operate, works
would have to be considered at a reasonable enough degree of
specificity to distinguish the ideas genuinely expressed in the
works in question. In taking up the Cariou case, the appeals court
makes note of substantial differences between Prince’s works and
Cariou’s:
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s
photographs.
Where Cariou’s serene and
deliberately composed portraits and landscape
photographs depict the natural beauty of
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs,
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand,
are hectic and provocative. Cariou’s black-and228

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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white photographs were printed in a 9 1/2" x 12"
book. Prince has created collages on canvas that
incorporates color, feature distorted human and
other forms and settings, and measure between ten
and nearly a hundred times the size of the
photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation,
scale, color palette, and media are fundamentally
different and new compared to the photographs, as
is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.229
Notably, all of these differences are, or arise from, differences
that the court sees in the form of the respective works. Judge
Wallace, in his partial dissent to the court’s opinion, notes that,
according to the majority, “all the Court needs to do here to
determine transformativeness is view the original work and the
secondary work and, apparently, employ its own artistic
judgment.”230 Wallace is rightly incredulous of this position:
transformation need not be apparent on a work’s surface. The
courts, I take it, would very much like it if cases could be decided
simply by looking at the works before them. Unfortunately for the
courts, neither art nor copyright works that way, and nor should
they. So, certainly, there is work to be done.
One of the great assets of the present Copyright Act is that it
was designed to accommodate future forms of art and technology
not predicted by its authors at the time of its framing. Although
Sturtevant was active when the Act was written, she was far from
well known—and it seems safe to assume that none of the Act’s
authors were familiar with the fictional Hank Herron. However,
appropriation art has since grown to become one of the most
fascinating—and most influential—movements in contemporary
art. As such, given the instrumental purpose of copyright law as
encoded in the Constitution, it seems incumbent upon the law to
seek to find a way of accommodating appropriation art within its
boundaries. What I suggest here is a conceptual framework for
understanding how the law might do just this by recognizing how
the appropriation artist transforms what she takes. Herron’s
229
230

Cariou v. Prince, No. 11-1197-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2013).
Id.
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imagined art, appropriated from Frank Stella, transformed Stella’s
work. A painting by Herron expressed an idea distinct from that of
a visually-indiscernible Stella, even if Herron’s idea was simply a
denial of his own originality.

